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Abstract
We examine the impact of various factors on the quality of environmental disclo-
sure. Combining multi-theories in a unique framework, it focuses on factors related 
to the strategy and vision of the firm (environmental audit, presence of an environ-
mental committee), diversity of and within boards (independence of the board, gen-
der diversity) and factors related to the environment (environmental performance, 
degree of pollution of the company). This study involves an attempt to develop a 
self-constructed index to measure environmental disclosure quality using qualita-
tive attributes as provided by IASB and GRI frameworks and following (Chauvey 
et al. in J Bus Ethics, 130(4):789–803, 2014). A number of econometric techniques 
are used including panel data specifications using a sample of French listed compa-
nies in SBF120 for the period 2009–2014. The study found that quality of disclosure 
remains relatively low. In addition, the findings indicate that a company’s strategy 
and vision (environmental audit), diversity in boards (gender diversity) and environ-
mental performance play significant roles in explaining variations in quality of envi-
ronmental disclosure. This paper sheds light on whether various factors could affect 
the credibility of disclosed information using a multi theory framework. Standards 
setters and policy makers are recommended to think about implementing a generally 
accepted framework of non-financial reporting to answer the demand for more trans-
parency and accountability. This paper fills the gap in the literature by highlight-
ing an unexplored area of literature related to the quality of non-financial reporting 
drawing upon the regulatory framework of financial reporting.
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1 Introduction
Over the last few years, researchers have attempted to study the motivations 
behind disclosing non-financial information in different contexts. However, there 
is a sense that what has been concluded so far is partial, contradictory and incon-
clusive leading to the need for different methods of research (Spence and Gray 
2007). This paper proposes to study the effect of various factors on the quality 
of environmental disclosure, which has attracted major interest in recent schol-
arly literature. The motivations for the current study arise from the nature of the 
regulatory framework of environmental disclosure in the French context and from 
the gaps in the literature. Our study based on the French context, which character-
ized by a widely implemented regulatory framework of environmental disclosure. 
France considered as pioneer country that has enacted legislation for mandatory 
social and environmental disclosure. At first, the NRE Act (Nouvelle Regulation 
Economique) was launched in 2001, which requires listed companies to integrate 
social and environmental information into their annual reports. However, much 
criticism has been directed toward this law for the lack of its specificity (Chau-
vey et al. 2014). They indicate that existing French regulation does not appear to 
improve the quality of CSR disclosure and still seems to be more about legitimi-
zation than transparency. Consequently, the Grenelle Act II of 2012 was set up to 
address the gaps in the first law. This act calls for more credibility and transpar-
ency of disclosed information as it requires third-party verification.
Moreover, this study is set up to fill the gap in prior literature and seeks to 
respond to the call of many scholars to search for a comprehensive and sensible 
measure of disclosure quality. For example, Beattie et al. (2004: 233) argue that: 
“Researchers investigating the determinants of disclosure quality could be wast-
ing their effort if the primary variable of interest is not being measured with a suf-
ficient degree of accuracy”. In addition, environmental reporting quality has not 
been universally acclaimed given its challenge in providing accurate and trans-
parent information (Kolk 2008). In addition, non-financial disclosure has been 
always criticized for a lack of relevance and credibility (Michelon et  al. 2015). 
Furthermore, prior research fails to provide an accurate measure of environmen-
tal disclosure quality due to the lack of convincing theoretical underpinning and 
the subjectivity that surround the developed proxies.
Thus, to fill this gap, we focus on the quality of environmental disclosure 
and factors that may influence such reporting. We confute the assumption that a 
high volume of disclosed environmental information contributes to a high qual-
ity of disclosure, following Brammer and Pavelin (2008) who find that prior 
studies on environmental disclosure suffer from difficulties in measuring qual-
ity. We also confute the statement of Botosan (2004) that the disclosure quality 
is inherently immeasurable. Moreover, Beattie et  al. (2004) note that, given the 
weaknesses and limitations of previous approaches to measuring disclosure, it is 
essential to provide new ways and provide proxies for disclosure quality, which 
will develop a comprehensive disclosure profile. Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) 
indicate that quantity is not a good proxy for disclosure quality in assessing 
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narrative disclosure and the richness and quantity of disclosure are two independ-
ent dimensions. Due to the absence of norms and standards related to non-finan-
cial reporting and, in support of our preposition, we follow (Solomon 2000) and 
the Federation des Experts Comptables Européeanne (FEE 1999) who argued that 
environmental disclosure, which could shadow financial reporting and qualitative 
principles and frameworks, as applied successfully to financial reporting, can be 
effectively applied to environmental disclosure’.
Very few studies have investigated the possibility of using the qualitative attrib-
utes of financial reporting to construct a measure for corporate environmental report-
ing. Our research seeks to shine new light on these debates through an examination 
of the environmental disclosure quality under the conceptual framework of financial 
reporting. We follow Chauvey et al. (2014) to construct our disclosure quality index 
using attributes as discussed by the International Accounting Standards Board, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, and the Global Reporting Initiative.
Relying on a multiple theory framework: stakeholders theory, neo institutional 
theory, resource dependence theory and human capital theory, for the study’s basic 
sample group, we selected French publicly listed companies in the SBF 120 index 
for the period 2009–2014. This based on multi-theoretical framework because envi-
ronmental reporting is a complex phenomenon that cannot be explained by a single 
theory (Tagesson et al. 2009). In this study, we use both univariate and multivariate 
regression models to examine how a company’s strategy and vision which are mani-
fested by the environmental audit and existence of an environmental committee. In 
addition, this study, then, is intended to fill a gap by distinguishing diversity among 
boards from diversity within boards and their effects on environmental disclosure 
(Hafsi and Turgut 2013). Finally, we study the influence of firm’s environmental 
performance and degree of pollution on environmental disclosure quality.
Findings are generally consistent with our expectations. First, consistent with neo 
institutional theory firms that adopt environmental audit is likely to provide higher 
quality environmental information. Second, board diversity manifested by gender 
diversity has an observable impact. In addition, environmental performance is posi-
tively and significantly associated with both dimensions. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first such study undertaken in France that sheds new light on the 
quality of environmental disclosure and their relationships with various factors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a 
survey of theoretical and empirical literature in order to develop our hypothesis. The 
Sect. 3 illustrates the research methodology in term of sample, data and models. The 
Sect. 4 is dedicated to empirical findings. The final section offers a discussion of our 
findings and makes concluding comments.
2  Background and hypothesis development
This section aims to explore prior research related to the determinants of environ-
mental disclosure quality in order to develop our hypothesis. We first cover the 
multi- theory framework and then the factors that might affect disclosure quality.
 F. Baalouch et al.
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2.1  Environmental disclosure quality
There is no universal accepted definition of environmental disclosure quality. How-
ever, authors such as Brammer and Pavelin (2008) state that its quality relates to 
its value relevance to a variety of interested and outside parties and is subject to 
external audit. It is determined by the usefulness of environmental information to 
users for better decision-making (Ane 2012). On the other hand, De Villiers and Van 
Staden (2011) wrote on the audit of this information in order to ensure its reliability 
and to hold managers accountable for the environmental impact of their decisions. 
Michelon et al. (2015) define the richness of CSR information as the extent to which 
information helps users appreciate the social and environmental impact of corporate 
activities and to infer management’s approach to CSR. Each of the aforementioned 
definitions refers to a particular characteristic of information and is dependent upon 
the purpose of the research.
2.2  Theories regarding environmental disclosure
Given the lack of a common theoretical framework, prior literature typically empha-
sizes the determinants of non-financial reporting using socio-political and economic 
based theories (Braam et  al. 2016). At this level, Gray and Handley (2015) argue 
that CSR is a multidimensional complex activity which cannot be explained by a 
single theoretical perspective because it depends on complementary forces. Neo-
Institutional theory has been widely used in prior studies related to social and envi-
ronmental disclosure based on the assumption that organizations tend to use such 
disclosure to respond to various pressures from the institutional environment. DiM-
aggio and Powell (1983) noted that the key aspect of institutional theory as iso-
morphism.1 The aim of this theory is to explain the behavior of organizations with 
reference to their institutional environment when companies have to comply. In the 
context of current research, Monjarret (2014) notes that verification of social and 
environmental information in the French context is considered to be a response to 
normative pressures exercised by the Grenelle Act II which constitutes the process 
from which public authorities attempt to regulate CSR practices. Stakeholder the-
ory is another frequently adopted theoretical perspective, which sheds light on the 
intensity of conflicting powerful stakeholder’ demands and preferences. Stakeholder 
theory indicates that organizations focus on broad concepts of overall accountability 
to various stakeholders. It will probably provide a clear explanation for the willing-
ness of companies to provide high quality environmental information (Liao et  al. 
2014). Another recognized theory is the resource dependence theory, which rec-
ognizes the influence of external factors on the organizational behavior of the firm 
(Hillman and Dalziel 2003). At this level, managers will search to avoid dependence 
on their external environment and reduce uncertainty by focusing on the resources 
of the firm. At this level, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) focus on the need to match 
1 Which refer to the similarity in forms and processes and the homogeneity in structures and practices 
by organisations in order to conform to predominant norms and traditions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
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the needs of the company with the resources provided by the board since the board 
of directors is considered as a sum of capital (human and social capital) which will 
affect both monitoring and resource provision (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). Accord-
ing to Bear et al. (2010), RDT is used as the theoretical underpinning of the impact 
of gender diversity in the board on CSR and CSR reporting, since it relies on the 
key functions of the board. Human capital theory is considered a complement to the 
resource dependence theory, as it discusses how education, experience and skills of 
human capital can benefit the organizations (Carter et al. 2010). The origin of the 
human capital theory dates back to the work of Becker (1964) that addresses the role 
of a person’s stock of education, experience and their marketable skills in improving 
a firm’s performance. In our case, the human capital theory is needed to discuss the 
diversity performance relationship (Terjesen et al. 2009).
3  Hypothesis development
Empirical research on the determinants of environmental disclosure is exhaus-
tive and provides partial, contradictory and inconclusive results (Spence and Gray 
2007). Whereas, factors influencing the quality of environmental disclosure still not 
discussed.
3.1  Factors related to the strategy and vision of the firm
These are factors related to the strategy and vision of the firm in terms of environ-
mental issues. They include the existence of an environmental or CSR committee on 
the board and environmental audit.
3.1.1  Presence of environmental committee
The establishment of an environmental committee is viewed as a capital resource 
for the firm. The experience, skills and knowledge of such a committee are 
expected to play a crucial role in ensuring a better quality of environmental 
reporting (Amran et al. 2013). This supports the expectation that an environmen-
tal committee within the board of directors will monitor and promote manage-
ment activities while seeking ways to increase the firm’s alignment with stake-
holders’ interests (Peters and Romi 2012). Prior research on CSR reporting has 
shown that the existence of an environmental committee within the board shows a 
company’s commitment towards sustainability and its willingness to manage the 
conflicts between different stakeholder groups. As indicated by Peters and Romi 
(2012), the presence of an environmental committee helps companies to evaluate 
reporting systems and affects their quality. The EC has been seen as a signal of 
board orientation toward environmental accountability, which includes adequate 
communication with external stakeholders (Liao et  al. 2014). In the same vein, 
Michael and Jill (2009) indicates that firms establish EC’s in order to address 
environmental issues from the perspective of risks and strategic opportunities of 
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their powerful stakeholders. To sum up, we consider that the presence of an envi-
ronmental committee within the board may be seen as a monitoring device for 
improving environmental disclosure and demonstrating accountability towards 
powerful stakeholders. Therefore, we propose the first hypothesis:
H1 Firms with an environmental committee provide high quality environmental 
disclosure.
3.1.2  The environmental audit
Environmental audit is implemented in France in order to monitor compliance 
with new laws and regulations related to non-financial disclosure. We draw on 
the neo-institutional perspective to build this hypothesis. In the French context 
external assurance of environmental information considered as normative pres-
sure. Listed companies have to comply with the requirement of the article 225 of 
the Grenelle Act II, which requires a third party verification of disclosed infor-
mation in order to ensure credibility. It is a response to public pressure about 
the insufficient reliability and the lack of accuracy of environmental information 
(Braam et al. 2016). In the same vein, GRI (2013) highlights the importance of 
sustainability reporting’s assurance and its role in increasing recognition, trust 
and credibility for stakeholders. However, owing to the relative newness of the 
practice, empirical analysis of CSR assurance is limited and few studies to date 
investigate its impact (Brikey et al. 2016). Proactively signaling the credibility of 
their corporate environmental reporting practice, environmental audit influences 
the perceptions of a company regarding its accountability, thus increasing stake-
holder’s trust and corporate reputation (Braam et al. 2016). Therefore, from neo 
institutional perspectives and given the debate over the use of assurance prac-
tices, we extend prior research by examining the role of environmental assurance 
in enhancing the quality of environmental disclosures. We consider environmen-
tal audit as a response to normative pressure exercised by French regulation to 
improve transparency and credibility of environmental information. Thus, we for-
mally state the second hypothesis:
H2 External assurance of environmental information is positively associated with 
the quality of environmental disclosure.
3.2  Diversity in/of the board
We focus on the impact of boardroom diversity through gender diversity and 
independence of the board. The choice of these characteristics is due to their 
impact on the strength of corporate governance. It is assumed that the strength of 
the board of directors is closely related to the degree of independence and diver-
sity of its members (Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia Sanchez 2010).
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3.2.1  Gender diversity
Our expectations of the impact of gender diversity on environmental report-
ing quality is supported by empirical research and multi theoretical framework. 
Resource dependence theory and human capital theory indicates that firms tend 
to match between their needs and the resources provided by board members, 
such as education, experience and skills to benefit the organization and take into 
account ethical considerations such as environmental commitments. In this sense, 
the role of women on the board as well as on top-level positions has become a hot 
topic of research in accounting, management, etc. Literature suggests that compa-
nies with a greater number of females on their boards are an important dimension 
of corporate governance, because culturally, traditionally and socially, women are 
different from men (Liao et al. 2014). Forte (2004) provides evidence that women 
are more likely than men to identify situations requiring ethical judgment and to 
behave ethically. Some have argued that women may be more aware of environ-
mental issues and are more concerned about reducing perceived risks (Post et al. 
2011). In France, the context of our study, the law requires 50% gender parity on 
the board of every public firm by 2015 (Post et  al. 2015). Adams et  al. (2015) 
indicates that men and women present differences in terms of ethical behavior 
and those female directors have different values and are more stakeholders ori-
ented. From a cultural point of view, women are considered to care more about 
the quality of life than material success (Hofstede et al. 2010) which leads them 
to be more concerned about the environmental commitment of the company and 
the wellbeing of the society.
Our expectation that the presence of females on boards of directors affects envi-
ronmental disclosure is further supported by empirical research. Adams and Fer-
reira (2009) observe female directors to have a similar impact to that of independent 
directors. They may demand greater environmental reporting quality. In addition, 
firms with a high percentage of women on the board of directors are more socially 
responsible (Seto-Pamies 2013). Recent research suggests that board gender diver-
sity may affect reporting quality, compliance and ethical behavior. Al Shaer and 
Zaman (2016) find a positive influence of female presence in the board on sustain-
ability reporting quality. Bear et  al. (2010) provide evidence that females on the 
boards positively influence the strength rating for CSR. Moreover, Ben Amar et al. 
(2015) note that female representation on the board enhances board effectiveness 
in stakeholders’ management and promotes the adoption of sustainability initiatives 
related to reporting about climate change.
To sum up, while the importance of board gender diversity is widely recognized, 
empirical evidence on its benefits and impact on environmental reporting, even 
though limited, are inconclusive and have produced mixed results (Harjoto et  al. 
2015). From the extensive literature review, it is predicted that female representation 
on boards of directors may affects environmental reporting. The hypothesis is stated 
as follows:
H3 Gender diverse boards have a positive association with the quality of environ-
mental disclosure.
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3.2.2  Board independence
The presence of independent directors on boards is pivotal since they contribute by 
their experience to the firm Board independence (Barros et al. 2013). They play a 
crucial role in making decisions related to the ethical commitments of the firm, such 
as CSR, in order to be accountable towards a wide range of stakeholders (Rao and 
Tilt 2015). The influence of independent directors on CSR activities has been the 
subject of few theoretical and empirical studies in the French context (Ducassy and 
Montandrau 2015). In this regard, several authors affirm that board effectiveness 
in dealing with non-financial disclosure must be determined by its independence 
because it is closely related to the strength of the board (Garcia-Sanchez and Mar-
tinez Ferrero 2016). Independent directors contribute by their skills, connections 
and contacts to satisfy all stakeholders, thus ensuring corporate survival (Fuente 
et  al. 2017). On this level, Ibrahim and Angelidis (1995) consider that the pres-
ence of outside independent directors reinforces the monitoring role of the board, as 
they are more sensitive to society’s needs and more concerned with ethical matters. 
Moreover, authors like Zahra and Stanton (1988) report that independent directors 
are more interested in compliance with laws, regulations, and responsible behavior 
by the organization. Regarding environmental reporting, Rupley et al. (2012) indi-
cate that the presence of independent directors assists companies in achieving stra-
tegic goals and provides perspectives that may affect a firm’s willingness to publish 
transparent environmental information available to a wide range of stakeholders. 
For all these reasons, prior studies find that independent directors overall broader 
accountability to stakeholders is linked to the propensity of GHG disclosure (Liao 
et al. 2014). The previous arguments lead us to state this prediction formally as our 
fourth hypothesis.
H4 The quality of environmental disclosure is positively related to board 
independence.
3.3  Factors related to the environment
These factors include a firm’s environmental performance and degree of pollution 
caused by the company.
3.3.1  Environmental performance
Stakeholder theory suggests that companies should be more accountable to their 
stakeholders and need to signal their high performance to their most powerful stake-
holders. At this level, firms need to pay more attention to the quality of disclosed 
information. As indicated by Dhaliwal et  al. (2014), it is important to control for 
environmental performance when studying environmental disclosure. Prior research 
has extensively reviewed this relationship and provides mixed results. Superior 
environmental performers tend to signal this by disclosing relevant information to 
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stakeholders in order to gain a competitive advantage such as improving corporate 
reputation (Braam et  al. 2016). To distinguish themselves from poor performers, 
good environmental performers employ more objective and verifiable environmen-
tal disclosure to ensure credibility and accuracy for stakeholders (Clarkson et  al. 
2008). In the French context, Chelli et al. (2014) from an institutional perspective 
provide evidence that firms with poor environmental performance will engage in 
more extensive offsetting disclosure in an attempt to address increased threats to 
their legitimacy. On the other hand, Dhaliwal et al. (2014) find that CSR disclosure 
is used by companies as a positive signal demonstrating confidence in their perfor-
mance to investors or to offer an explanation in case of poor performance.
To sum up, the association between environmental performance and environ-
mental disclosure has been widely examined and findings remain inconclusive 
and show conflicting results. This could be due to the use of inappropriate proxies 
for environmental performance. Therefore, we state the following hypothesis:
H5 Higher quality environmental disclosure is positively associated with a compa-
ny’s environmental performance.
3.3.2  Degree of pollution of the company
There is growing scientific evidence of the effects of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions on global warming (Stern 2006). Consequently, concerns about climate 
change and global warming have prompted governments to set up policies and 
regulations in order to reduce industrial carbon emissions. Moreover, the issue 
of climate change has attracted considerable attention from various institutional 
investors and other stakeholders (Matsumura et al. 2014). For the context of our 
research, France is considered a pioneer country in terms of environmental regu-
lation and the fight against climate change. On the other hand, the phenomenon 
of climate change has received considerable attention from academic research, 
which focuses mainly on the disclosure by firms of information about their GHG 
emissions. The majority of these studies focus on the determinants of disclosure 
on GHG emissions as in (Liao et al. 2014) who consider that information about 
GHG emissions is vital for the decision making of stakeholders.
For the purpose of our study, we consider GHG emissions as an indication of 
the degree of pollution of the firm and the disclosure of such information will 
increase the transparency of the firm and the accountability toward stakehold-
ers. This type of information allows firms to respond to various pressures and to 
provide complete information about their environmental concerns. Based on Neo-
Institutional theory we consider that the publication by the firm of their GHG 
emissions is a response to coercive pressures exerted by the Grenelle Act II. On 
this level, we focus in the current study on the degree of pollution of the firm 
measured by their  CO2 emissions. We consider the disclosure of such information 
as contributing to the completeness of published information. It may be consid-
ered as a determinant of quality. We, therefore, hypothesis that:
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H6 The degree of pollution of the company is positively related to the quality of 
environmental disclosure.
4  Research design
4.1  Sample and data collection
To test the hypothesis developed above, the present research focuses on the 
French context, essentially firms listed in SBF120, which covers the most 120 
actively traded stocks listed in Paris over a six-year period (2009–2014) classi-
fied using the ICB industry classification. Using large companies contributes to 
a better exploration and analysis of the research question. Following El Ghoul 
et  al. (2011), we do not exclude financial companies as they are concerned by 
the existing regulation. We cover this long period because it provides the oppor-
tunity to draw out trends in environmental disclosure over time and to highlight 
different regulations such as the NRE Act of 2001 and then the Grenelle Act 
of 2012. The final sample is identified as 570 firm-observations (see Table 1). 
Table 1  Variables description
Definition Measurement
Dependent variable
 ED QUAL [ Relevance+Neutrality+Clarity+Comparability+Verifiability
5
]
Independent variables
 Variables related to strategy, vision of the company
  ENVT COM 1: Presence of board environmental committee
0: Otherwise
  ENVT AUD 1: Presence of environmental audit/assurance
0: Otherwise
Diversity in the board
 GEND DIV Percentage of women in the board members at the end of the fiscal 
year
 INDEP Percentage of independent board members as reported by the 
company
Variables related to the environment
 ENVT PERF ASSET4 Environmental score
 D-POLL Natural log of total  CO2 and  CO2 equivalents emissions
Control variables
 STAND REPORT Release of a stand-alone report: dummy variable equal to 1 if 
company releases a stand-alone CSR report, 0 otherwise
 SIZE The natural log of total assets
 PROF Net income/total assets in %
 LEVERAGE Debt to Assets ratio
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Annual and standalone reports are collected from companies’ homepages. Other 
data are extracted from the ASSET 4 database of Thomson Reuters. Data related 
to financial information are gathered from DataStream.
4.2  Empirical model
To test our hypotheses, all continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 
99th percentile of observations for the distribution of any of the regression vari-
ables. A fixed effects regression was applied. We run a Hausman test which indi-
cates a value 19.93 and Prob > chi2 = 0.0299 for the quality model. Therefore, 
fixed effects model is the more appropriate for panel data. However, our model 
suffer from Heteroskedasticity and a first order serial correlation in error terms. 
Then, in order to address this problem, individual and time fixed effects regres-
sion is modeled with the cluster option, which would provide robust estimates of 
the regression parameters according to Hoechle (2007). On this sense, Petersen 
(2009) found that in the presence of auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity in 
the data sets, the standard errors that are clustered by firms are unbiased and pro-
duce correctly sized confidence intervals. Moreover, time effects are employed 
to counter any unobserved cross-sectional and time series dependence. In addi-
tion, the analyses include industry dummies to control for the industry effect. 
The main regression model defined in the following equation:
where β0, the regression intercept; β1…β10, the regression coefficients; εi, the error 
term.
Table 2 summarises the definitions and measurements of the variables.
퐄퐍퐕 퐃퐈퐒퐂 퐐퐔퐀퐋 = 훃ퟎ + 훃ퟏ 퐄퐍퐕퐓 퐂퐎퐌 + 훃ퟐ 퐄퐍퐕퐓 퐀퐔퐃퐈퐓
+ 훃ퟑ 퐆퐄퐍퐃 퐃퐈퐕 + 훃ퟒ 퐈퐍퐃퐄퐏 + 훃ퟓ 퐄퐍퐕퐓 퐏퐄퐑퐅
+ 훃ퟔ 퐃 − 퐏퐎퐋퐋 + 훃ퟕ 퐒퐈퐙퐄 + 훃ퟖ 퐏퐑퐎퐅 + 훃ퟗ 퐋퐄퐕
+ 훃ퟏퟎ 퐒퐓퐀퐍퐃 퐑퐄퐏퐓 + 퐘퐞퐚퐫 퐅퐢퐱퐞퐝 퐄퐟퐟퐞퐜퐭퐬
+ 퐈퐧퐝퐮퐬퐭퐫퐲 퐅퐢퐱퐞퐝 퐄퐟퐟퐞퐜퐭퐬 + 훆퐢
Table 2  Sample composition Number of observations excluded Reason of 
exclusion
Total observations at start 720
Missing annual reports 37
Missing data in ASSET4 113
Total number of excluded observations 149
Final sample 570
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4.3  Variables measurement
4.3.1  Environmental disclosure quality
Manual content analysis is used to measure the quality of environmental infor-
mation disclosed by companies in annual and standalone reports. “Appendix 1” 
details the disclosure index for environmental disclosure. In terms of quality, the 
lack of a comprehensive conceptual framework for non-financial reporting and 
the absence of standards and norms led us to think about drawing upon the con-
ceptual framework for financial reporting to construct a measure of environmen-
tal disclosure quality. We rely on the proposition of Solomon (2000) that envi-
ronmental reporting could shadow financial reporting and qualitative attributes 
could be used to measure environmental disclosure quality. In the same vein, 
FEE provide evidence that qualitative principles as applied successfully to finan-
cial reporting can be effectively applied to environmental disclosure. We follow 
Chauvey et al. (2014) to measure disclosure quality based on the review of GRI 
guidelines and the conceptual frameworks of both the IASB and the FASB. Sev-
eral authors, such as Alotaibi and Hussainy (2016), have applied this approach 
for Saudi Arabian companies and, Michelon et al. (2015) in the UK to measure 
non-financial disclosure quality. For financial reporting, Beest et al. (2009) used 
the qualitative characteristics of information to provide a comprehensive measure 
of information quality.
An un-weighted approach was used to construct an operationalized measure of 
environmental disclosure quality based on qualitative characteristics of account-
ing information. This approach is relevant to all users’ groups of corporate reports 
because it helps to avoid the subjectivity of the researcher in coding the items 
used in the weighted method (Cooke 1989). The study adopts five attributes, 
which are ‘Relevance’, ‘Neutrality’, ‘Clarity’, ‘Comparability’ and ‘Verifiability’ 
following the index provided by Chauvey et al. (2014) in the French context (see 
details in “Appendix 2”). We determine an index for each attribute. Then, follow-
ing, Michelon et al. (2015) we compute a synthesis of the five qualitative charac-
teristics indexes using the simple arithmetic mean as follows:
In using content analysis, it is important to check the validity and reliabil-
ity of constructed indices (Milne and Adler 1999). The concepts of reliability 
and validity were carefully considered and assured in this study. Both supervi-
sors revised the disclosure quality index independently before making it final to 
ensure the validity of the instrument. The comments and feedback received from 
both supervisors were considered and used to revise the initial checklist of items. 
Both supervisors revised the disclosure quality index independently before mak-
ing it final to ensure the validity of the instrument. For the purpose of this study, 
we apply the inter-coder reliability using one single coder.
ED QUALit =
[
RELVi + NEUTi + CLARi + COMPi + VERFi
]
5
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4.3.2  Variables of interests
We focus on six main variables of interest. The variable ENV COM is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a company has a board level environmental committee and 0 
otherwise (Amran et al. 2013). ENVT AUD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm adopts environmental audit and 0 otherwise (Simnett et al. 2009). GEND DIV 
is measured by the percentage of female on the board. INDEP is the percentage of 
independent directors on a firm’s board of directors (Kassinis et al. 2016). ENVT 
PERF measures a firm’s environmental performance measured as the environmental 
score provided by ASSET42 (Del Bosco and Misani 2016). The variable D-POLL 
is the degree of pollution of the company measured as the natural logarithm of total 
 CO2 and  CO2 equivalents emissions (Matsumura et al. 2014).
4.3.3  Control variables
We use a set of control variables based on prior literature. We test the SIZE of the 
firm measures as the natural logarithm of the firm (Liao et al. 2014). PROF is the 
profitability of the company using the return on assets (ROA) measured as the net 
income to the total asset ratio (Braam et al. 2016). LEV is the financial leverage of 
the firm that equals debt to total assets (Ducassy and Montandrau 2015). Finally, 
STAND REP is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm issues a standalone report 
and 0 otherwise (Michelon et al. 2015). Table 1 provides a summary of the variable 
measurements. We expect that larger firms, large profits, large financing needs and 
that issue standalone reports to be associated with high quality environmental dis-
closure. Table 2 summarizes the measurement of variables.
5  Empirical results
5.1  Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 3. The 
Dependant variable is the quality of environmental disclosure in annual reports and 
stand-alone reports. QUAL presents a minimum of 0 and mean of 18.1% indicating 
that the efforts of French companies to improve the quality of environmental dis-
closure are still not have great importance as financial reporting. However, it seems 
that quality increases from one year to another increasing from 12.49% in 2009 to 
22.77% in 2014(see Fig.  1), indicating that the introduction of new regulations, 
mainly the Grenelle Act of 2012 affects the attitudes of companies toward credibility 
2 ASSET4 environmental pillar measures a company’s impact on living and non-living natural systems, 
including the air, land and water, as well as completes ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses 
best management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities 
in order to generate long-term shareholder value. Further information can be found here http://extra net.
datas tream .com/data/ASSET 4%20ESG /Index .htm.
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of such disclosure. These results are agree with the findings of Chauvey et al. (2014) 
in the French context who indicates that even if the regulatory framework of envi-
ronmental reporting is being approached, it appears to be so without a considerable 
increase in informational quality. 
The descriptive statistics of continuous independent variables indicates that 
gender diversity GEND DIV on the board, which represents the percentage of 
women on the board, ranges from 0 to 55 as a maximum with a mean of 21.68%. 
This is higher than the 14.1% reported in Al Shaer and Zaman (2016). However, 
this result indicates that the presence of women in the boardroom is still moder-
ate. During the same period, the percentage of independent board members presents 
Table 3  Summary statistics of 
dummy variables
ENVT COM = take a value of 1 if an environmental com-
mittee exists within the board and 0 otherwise. AUDIT = 1 if 
an environmental audit is provided and 0 otherwise. STAND 
REPORT = release of a stand-alone report: dummy variable equal to 
1 if company releases a stand-alone CSR report, 0 otherwise
Variables Frequency Percent
ENV COM
 0 96 16.84
 1 474 83.16
AUDIT
 0 157 27.64
 1 411 72.36
STAND REPT
 0 347 60.88
 1 223 39.12
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Fig. 1  Evolution of the mean of environmental disclosure quality over year
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a mean of 49.30% and maximum of 100%. Our findings are lower than the 54.5% 
mean reported by Liao et al. (2014) and almost the same findings of Ducassy and 
Montandrau (2015) for the SBF 120 companies with a mean of 47%. This indicates 
that French companies present on average highly independent boards.
In terms of environmental performance ENVT PERF, the mean environmental 
score as calculated by ASSET4 is 80.15. According to, the environmental score 
measures “how well a company uses best management practices to avoid envi-
ronmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities to generate long 
term shareholder value”. This result is similar to Del Bosco and Misani (2016) 
who reported a mean ASSET4 environmental score of 87.31 for companies in the 
Euronext Paris. The degree of pollution of the firm D_POLL presents a mean of 5.41 
Tons of  CO2 and  CO2 equivalent emissions, thus implying that the level of emis-
sions of French companies is considered high, creating a high degree of pollution.
Regarding the control variables, it can be observed that the sample companies 
are relatively large firms with a mean SIZE of 7.14 between a minimum of 5.83 and 
maximum of 9.31. This is similar to the result reported by Lakhal (2015) for the 
French listed companies with mean 7.87. In terms of profitability PROF, the mean 
of net income to total assets equals 3.182%. For the leverage LEV which equals total 
debt to total assets, the mean 0.2518 is close to the mean of 0.20 reported by Chau-
vey et  al. (2014) and 0.2734 reported by Lakhal (2015) for the SBF 1230 French 
companies.
Table  4 depicts descriptive statistics for the dummy variables, 83.16% of 
sample companies designated a specific environmental committee of the board, 
which implies that the majority of firms put in place environmental committees in 
order to review their sustainability policies and activities. For the environmental 
audit, 72.36% of companies provide third party verification for their information. 
This implies that the majority of firms’ seek to comply with existing laws and 
Table 4  Summary descriptive statistics: continuous variables
ENVT COM = take a value of 1 if an environmental committee exists within the board and 0 otherwise. 
AUDIT = 1 if an environmental audit is provided and 0 otherwise. GEND DIV = Percentage of women 
in the board members at the end of the fiscal year. INDEP = Percentage of independent board members 
as reported by the company. ENVT PERF = ASSET4’s Environmental Score. D-POLL = Natural Log of 
Total  CO2 and  CO2 equivalents emissions. SIZE =the natural log of total assets. PROF = Net income/
total assets in %. LEV = Debt to Assets ratio. STAND REPORT = Release of a stand-alone report: 
dummy variable equal to 1 if company releases a stand-alone CSR report, 0 otherwise
Variables N Mean SD Min Max p25 Median p75
QUAL 570 0.181 0.128 0 0.503 0.0667 0.181 0.272
GEND DIV 570 21.68 11.18 0 55 12.50 21.88 30
INDEP 570 49.30 19.70 0 100 33.32 45.45 62.70
ENVT PERF 570 80.15 19.34 10.84 94.86 74.63 89.17 92.94
D_POLL 570 5.411 1.072 2.204 8.205 4.886 5.390 6.070
SIZE 570 7.154 0.720 5.836 9.316 6.647 7.044 7.510
PROF 570 3.182 4.636 − 10.25 19.46 0.767 3.111 5.456
LEV 570 0.2518 0.1440 0.0118 0.5484 0.1527 0.2564 0.3489
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regulation in term of assurance of non-financial information, particularly in rela-
tion to the Grenelle Act II. Finally, only 39.12% of companies issue standalone 
reports other than annual reports. This indicates that the majorities are still not 
familiar with the voluntary disclosure of such reports and prefer to provide the 
required information in the annual reports, as required by regulation.
5.2  Univariate analysis: correlation matrix
Table 5 shows the bivariate relations resulting from the pairwise Pearson correla-
tion matrix between the quality of environmental disclosure and the independent 
variables. Correlations are estimated using longitudinal and pooled data across 
the six-year sample period. As documented earlier, QUAL of environmental dis-
closure is positively and significantly associated at the 5% level with GEND DIV, 
ENVT PERF, D_POLL, and SIZE and LEV. However, contrary to what is expected, 
INDEP is negatively and positively associated with quality of environmental dis-
closure. PROF had no significant correlation with QUAL. Significant correlation 
between SIZE and ENVT PERF exist at 0.44. However, according to Field (2009), 
this is not considered a problem as it falls below the maximum threshold of 0.8. 
Therefore, the correlation matrix results do not raise any issues concerning multi-
collinearity. We checked for the multi-collinearity issue using the variance inflation 
factor (VIF). After running multiple regression analysis is Stata, we find that the 
maximum VIF is 1.30. As a rule of thumb, a variable with VIF greater than 10 need 
further investigation (Hail and Leuz 2006). Therefore, the model does not suffer 
from multicollinearity.
Table 5  Correlation matrix (N = 570)
ENVT COM = take a value of 1 if an environmental committee exists within the board and 0 otherwise. 
AUDIT = 1 if an environmental audit is provided and 0 otherwise. GEND DIV = percentage of women 
in the board members at the end of the fiscal year. INDEP = percentage of independent board members 
as reported by the company. ENVT PERF = ASSET4’s Environmental Score. D-POLL = natural log of 
total  CO2 and  CO2 equivalents emissions. SIZE =the natural log of total assets. PROF = Net income/total 
assets in %. LEV = debt to assets ratio. STAND REPORT = release of a stand-alone report: dummy vari-
able equal to 1 if company releases a stand-alone CSR report, 0 otherwise
QUAL GEND 
DIV
INDEP ENVT PERF D_POLL SIZE PROF LEV
QUAL 1.000
GEND 
DIV
0.183*** 1.000
INDEP − 0.100* 0.074 1.000
ENVT 
PERF
0.290*** 0.116** 0.035 1.000
D_POLL 0.147*** 0.026 0.105* 0.335*** 1.000
SIZE 0.190*** 0.188*** 0.016 0.449*** 0.345*** 1.000
PROF − 0.082 0.034 − 0.044 − 0.210*** − 0.244*** − 0.299*** 1.000
LEV 0.185*** − 0.030 − 0.083* − 0.096* 0.129** − 0.023 − 0.206*** 1.000
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5.3  Empirical tests and findings
Table  6 depicts the results of panel data fixed effects regression estimates or the 
cross sectional time series regression with observations from all 6  years. These 
results highlight the determinants of environmental disclosure quality. As indicated 
in the table, the models are highly significant (based on the model F-statistic) with 
an adjusted R2 of 0.189.
Unlike what was predicted earlier, the association between the existence of an 
environmental committee ENV COM on the board and quality are not significant. 
Therefore, hypothesis H1 is not supported. A possible explanation for this result is 
that the presence of an environmental committee on the board for French companies 
does not only aim to set up better environmental disclosure policy for stakeholders. 
It may be viewed as a legitimacy tool and not necessarily to improve non-financial 
reporting policy.
Table 6  Determinants of 
environmental disclosure 
quality: fixed effects regression
ENVT COM = take a value of 1 if an environmental committee 
exists within the board and 0 otherwise. AUDIT = 1 if an environ-
mental audit is provided and 0 otherwise. GEND DIV = percent-
age of women in the board members at the end of the fiscal year. 
INDEP = percentage of independent board members as reported 
by the company. ENVT PERF = ASSET4’s Environmental Score. 
D-POLL = natural log of total  CO2 and  CO2 equivalents emissions. 
SIZE =the natural log of total assets. PROF = net income/total assets 
in %. LEV = debt to Assets ratio. STAND REPORT = release of a 
stand-alone report: dummy variable equal to 1 if company releases a 
stand-alone CSR report, 0 otherwise
*, **, and ***significance at p < 0.01; p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respec-
tively
Variables Quality
ENVT COM − 0.0203 (0.0148)
AUDIT 0.0536*** (0.0136)
GEND DIV 0.00104** (0.000524)
INDEP − 0.000706*** (0.000249)
ENVT PERF 0.00154*** (0.000314)
D_POLL 0.00376 (0.00526)
SIZE 0.00786 (0.00834)
PROF 0.000936 (0.00116)
LEV 0.00177*** (0.000360)
STAND REP − 0.0279*** (0.0107)
Constant − 0.0671 (0.0585)
Observations 568
R-squared 0.209
Adj R-squared 0.193
Industry FE Yes
Year FE Yes
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The third party verification of environmental information is a mandatory act for 
French listed companies from April 2012 with the new regulation Grenelle II. The 
result is consistent with neo-institutional theory more precisely the normative pres-
sures exercised by French regulation in terms of assurance of non-financial informa-
tion when companies must also seek independent third-party verification for their 
reports, as well as an opinion about the sincerity of information disclosed. AUDIT 
is positively and significantly associated with quality at a 1% level. Thus, hypothesis 
H2 is supported.
The results are largely in agreement with the existing French regulation in term 
of non-financial information assurance, which implies that French companies go 
beyond just the publication of such information and verify it. The results are in line 
with the findings of Moroney et  al. (2012), which show a high quality of volun-
tary environmental disclosure scores for assured companies rather than non-assured 
firms. For the French context, Gilet (2011) conducted an interview with sustaina-
bility managers and found that companies used assurance to ensure accountability 
to stakeholders and the reliability of disclosed information. Recently, Braam et al. 
(2016) confirmed a positive and significant association at the 5% level between 
external verification and the reliability and accuracy of environmental informa-
tion provided in corporate environmental reports. Therefore, we conclude from the 
results below that third party assurance affects the credibility of disclosed informa-
tion because, under French regulation, any incomplete or omitted information (indi-
cators) without any explanation should be reported in auditors’ statements. The 
opinion of the auditor concerns the accuracy of published information, the explica-
tion, if any, in the absence of required information and the procedures implemented 
to conduct the audit (KPMG 2014). In summary, it seems that French companies in 
their strategy and vision related to nonfinancial disclosure focus more on compli-
ance with law and regulations (assurance) rather than legitimacy issues(role of the 
environmental committee).
It was expected that diversity of the board, which includes independence INDEP 
and gender diversity GEND DIV, would increase quality of the environmental dis-
closure. The findings are consistent with our expectations, thus hypothesis H3 is 
confirmed while H4 is rejected.
As evidenced in prior literature, the presence of women at the top level of man-
agement in the organization has been attracting considerable attention mainly in the 
issue of CSR. We find the presence of women on the board of directors not only 
allows companies to be better financial performers,3 but also take concerted action 
toward another pillar of sustainability, environmental performance. To the best 
of the author’s knowledge, there is even less research on the relationship between 
gender diversity in an organization as a whole and that organization’s environmen-
tal disclosure quality in the French context. The findings provide support for the 
resource dependence theory and human capital theory. It indicates that the propor-
tion of female on the board GEND DIV allows firms to drawn from a variety of 
3 Firms managed by females executives show higher level of financial performance than males because 
female are more risk-averse and less overconfident (Barber and Odean 2001).
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skills, education and experience to provide more accurate environmental disclosure. 
These theories focus on the role of individual’s capabilities which are manifested 
in the stock of education, skills and experience in influencing the performance of 
the board of directors’ members and thus environmental reporting quality. Thus, 
our findings are consistent with our prior expectations and H4 is supported. These 
results are in line with the findings of Liao et  al. (2014) which find that a small 
number of females on the board of directors do make a difference in GHG disclosure 
decisions. On the other hand, Konrad and Kramer (2006) find that females tend to be 
more concerned about the demands of stakeholders which can explain our results. 
Post et al. (2011) argued that women might be more aware about of environmental 
issues and draw further attention to them in order to reduce the perceived risks.
Furthermore, we have shown that firms, which tend to be more gender conscious, 
tend to pay more attention to the quality of the disclosed information. On this level, 
Gul et  al. (2011) indicate that females tend to adopt more trust building relation-
ships compared to males and thus, may put more emphasis on providing high quality 
information. Recently, and in the same vein, Al Shaer and Zaman (2016), based on 
the idea that a diverse board will pay greater attention to stakeholders’ concerns, 
they used a range of proxies for gender diversity to test its effect on the quality of 
sustainability reporting. They find that gender diverse boards are positively and 
significantly associated at a 1% level with a higher quality of sustainability report-
ing and independent female directors have a greater effect on sustainability report-
ing quality than male directors. Another possible explanation is that in France, the 
context of the current study, the law requires 50% gender parity on the board of 
every public firm by 2015, which reinforces the role of women on boards of direc-
tors in disclosure policy particularly. Moreover, there was the European Parliament 
to impose a female quota for non-executive directors of companies listed on stock 
exchanges throughout the European Union (COM 614, 2012).4
The presence of independent directors on the board is significantly but negatively 
associated with quality of environmental disclosure. In this sense, it is possible to 
affirm that these directors do not enhance non-financial disclosure. These results 
show an opposition of independent directors to environmental disclosure practices. 
These findings are in line with Garcia-Sanchez and Martinez Ferrero (2016) find a 
negative and significant association between the utility and comparability of CSR 
disclosure and board independence. In the Saudi Arabia context, Alotaibi and Hus-
sainy (2016) find similar finding through a negative influence of board independence 
on the quality of CSR disclosure. Furthermore, Zhang et al. (2013) find the propor-
tion of outside directors to be negatively and significantly associated with corporate 
social performance indicating that board independence is not adequate to enhance 
positive ratings of CSR. Moreover, our results are opposite to the findings of Duca-
ssy and Montandrau (2015) who find a positive and significant relationship between 
4 COM 614. 2012. Proposal for a directive COM (2012) 614 final: Proposal for a directive of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of 
companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures. Brussels: EuropeanCommission. http://eurle 
x.europ a.eu/legal conte nt/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX :52012 PC061 4andf rom=EN.
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CSR performance and independence of the board. They explain that by the fact that 
members of the boards who have no personal vested interests improve firm’s social 
performance. Therefore, it can be argued from the results obtained that the unwill-
ingness of outside independent directors to draw further attention to non-financial 
disclosure may be because of the absence of clear insight about the credibility of 
such information. On this level, the misleading nature of disclosed information will 
increase the reputation risks of those outside independent directors.
According to stakeholder’ theory, companies should be able to respond to com-
plex regulations and build trusting, engaging, and constructive dialogue with their 
stakeholders in order to develop a competitive advantage. Environmental disclo-
sure about the firm’s performance will help stakeholders get a better sense of how 
companies can effectively contribute to a more just and sustainable world. On this 
level the association between environmental performance ENVT PER measured 
by the ASSET4’ environmental score presents a positive and significant associa-
tion at the 1% level with the quality of environmental disclosure. This association 
has been extensively reviewed in prior literature using a variety of proxies lead to 
mixed results. This result is consistent with our predictions and thus hypothesis H5 
is confirmed. These results are in line with Al-Tuwaijiri et  al. (2004) who argued 
that firms with good environmental performance use environmental disclosure as a 
tool to disseminate “good news” to stakeholders. Cho et al. (2010) find that a firm’s 
environmental performance is positively associated with “optimism “level of envi-
ronmental disclosure. These results could be explained by the fact that companies 
with poor environmental performance use more optimistic language tone in their 
disclosure. However, this association is negative and significant to environmental 
disclosure “certainty” indicating that firms with bad environmental performance 
use less certain language for disclosure. We explain our findings in that whether 
firms have good or bad ENVT PERF, they use environmental disclosure either to 
demonstrate confidence in their performance or to offer an explanation. To sum up, 
consistent with stakeholder’ theory, firms with good ENVT PERF, manifested by 
the ability of their management to avoid environmental risks, produce more credible 
environmental information in order to reinforce the confidence of their stakeholders.
The degree of pollution D_POLL measured as the total of  CO2 and  CO2 equiva-
lent emissions provides no significant association with the quality of environmental 
disclosure. This result could be explained by the existing regulatory framework of 
GHG emissions in France where listed companies are required to publish informa-
tion about their emissions in another document called “Bilan Carbone” aside from 
the annual reports or stand-alone reports.
For the control variables, SIZE and profitability PROF have no association with 
quality of environmental disclosure. Leverage LEV presents a positive and signifi-
cant association at the 1% level, indicating that companies with a high level of lever-
age tend to disseminate a high amount and better quality of nonfinancial informa-
tion in order to reduce the negative impact of being highly levered in the eyes of 
their investors. The issuance of standalone reports STAND REP is negatively and 
significantly associated with QUAL. In the French context, this is considered a vol-
untary act under the discretion of the manager. (Michelon et al. 2015) find that the 
introduction of such practice indicates the effectiveness of the firm’s commitment to 
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CSR and thus contributes to enhancing environmental disclosure quality. They find 
a positive and significant association between the content of CSR disclosure and the 
issuance of standalone reports. Contrary to our expectations, the issuance of stan-
dalone reports negatively affects the level and richness of environmental disclosure. 
This result could be explained by the fact that in France the publication of reports 
other than the annual reports is still voluntary and is not subject to mandatory veri-
fication. However, referring to our analysis, the majority of French listed companies 
use standalone reports to publish mandatory information which, may mislead firm’s 
various stakeholders. Overall, mandatory information in the annual reports will be 
more appreciated by users.
5.4  Additional sensitivity and robustness checks
5.4.1  An alternative measure of environmental disclosure quality
To draw stronger inferences between the quality of environmental disclosure and 
the independent variables, we present a set of sensitivity tests. First, we replicate 
our analysis using an alternative measure of environmental disclosure quality based 
on the adoption of GRI principles following (Latridis 2013) to assess the robustness 
of our findings. The measure is a dummy variable and thus, we use logit specifica-
tion tests. When we use the dummy variable GRI adoption as an alternative measure 
of environmental disclosure,5 the existence of an environmental committee on the 
board ENVT COM becomes positive and significant with the quality of environ-
mental. This could be explained by the fact that firm ‘s ‘environmental committee 
members prefer to follow the reporting principles provided by GRI in presenting 
environmental information to stakeholders. Environmental performance ENVT 
PERF remains significant at the 5% level. The degree of pollution of the company 
becomes positive and significant at the 1% level which provides evidence that com-
panies following the GRI reporting principles tend to provide the maximum of infor-
mation even those which is mandatory in order to provide a complete picture about 
the firm’s environmental commitments and impact on the natural environment.
5.4.2  Controlling for industry sensitivity
Prior research documents systematic differences in environmental disclosure qual-
ity across industries and suggests that the role of these disclosures may also vary 
by the environmental sensitivity of the industry. Thus, including firms from both 
sensitive and non-sensitive industries has the potential to enhance our understand-
ing of environmental disclosures. We perform another sensitive analysis to verify 
whether the different tests in disclosure scores are robust to the classification of 
sample firms as operating in environmentally sensitive industries6 (basic materials, 
5 DataStream ICB (Industry Classification Benchmark) industry classification.
6 Results, not tabulated, are generally consistent with those in Table 6.
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utilities, consumer goods, health care and oil& Gas) and non-polluted industries 
(consumers services, financials, industrials, telecommunication and technology) fol-
lowing (Dhaliwal et al. 2014). Results remain the same as provided in Table 6. How-
ever, gender diversity GEND DIV becomes not significant for non-polluting compa-
nies, positive, and significant for polluting companies, which implies that the role of 
women is stronger in polluting companies because they are more visible to society 
and stakeholders. As a result, the presence of females on board of directors influence 
the quality of environmental reporting provided by polluting companies in order to 
add some legitimacy to their activities and enhance their reputation in the eyes of 
different stakeholders. The same results were obtained for independent directors, 
which are significant and negative for quality for the firms operating in environmen-
tally sensitive industries. This provides evidence that diversity on the board of direc-
tors in general contributes to enhancing the credibility of environmental reporting 
Table 7  Additional analysis: 
regressions of quality of 
environmental disclosure: 
industry subsamples
ENVT COM = take a value of 1 if an environmental committee 
exists within the board and 0 otherwise. AUDIT = 1 if an environ-
mental audit is provided and 0 otherwise. GEND DIV = percent-
age of women in the board members at the end of the fiscal year. 
INDEP = percentage of independent board members as reported 
by the company. ENVT PERF = ASSET4’s Environmental Score. 
D-POLL = natural log of total  CO2 and  CO2 equivalents emissions. 
SIZE =the natural log of total assets. PROF = net income/total assets 
in %. LEV = Debt to Assets ratio. STAND REPORT = release of a 
stand-alone report: dummy variable equal to 1 if company releases a 
stand-alone CSR report, 0 otherwise
*, **, and ***significance at p < 0.01; p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respec-
tively
Quality
Polluted firms Non polluted firms
ENVT COM − 0.0127 (0.0209) − 0.0287 (0.0207)
AUDIT 0.0601*** (0.0191) 0.0490** (0.0199)
GEND DIV 0.00158** (0.000786) 0.000709 (0.000703)
INDEP − 0.00115*** (0.000363) − 0.000407 (0.000343)
ENVT PER 0.00114*** (0.000433) 0.00184*** (0.000446)
D_POLL 0.0126 (0.00785) − 0.00248 (0.00702)
SIZE − 0.00288 (0.0135) 0.0144 (0.0106)
PROF − 0.000832 (0.00173) 0.00186 (0.00155)
LEV 0.000735 (0.000545) 0.00237*** (0.000475)
STAND REP − 0.0240 (0.0161) − 0.0298** (0.0143)
Constant 0.0199 (0.0960) − 0.112 (0.0756)
Observations 208 360
R-squared 0.251 0.171
Adj  R2 0.213 0.147
year FE YES YES
industry FE YES YES
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mainly for firms that face large pressure from society and stakeholders due to the 
nature of their activities. Environmental performance remains positive and signifi-
cant for all the models. Table 7 provides the results for polluting and non-polluting 
firms.
5.4.3  The effect of the introduction of Grenelle act II
As a third sensitivity test, since we are working on the French context, it’s important 
to study whether the change in existing regulations in term of non-financial report-
ing has an effect on environmental disclosure. To do that, we generate a dummy 
variable, which equal to one if the year is after 2012 the period after the adoption 
of Grenelle act II, which reinforce the level of mandatory information disclosed and 
call for more credibility, and 0 otherwise. We run our regression using the period 
before and after 2012 the year of change. Results presented in Table 8 remain almost 
Table 8  Regression results with 
dummy variable GRENELLE 
II act
ENVT COM = take a value of 1 if an environmental committee 
exists within the board and 0 otherwise. AUDIT = 1 if an environ-
mental audit is provided and 0 otherwise. GEND DIV = percent-
age of women in the board members at the end of the fiscal year. 
INDEP = percentage of independent board members as reported 
by the company. ENVT PERF = ASSET4’s Environmental Score. 
D-POLL = natural log of total  CO2 and  CO2 equivalents emissions. 
GRENELLE II: dummy variable equal to 1 if the period is after2012 
and 0 for the period before 2012. SIZE =the natural log of total 
assets. PROF = net income/total assets in %. LEV = debt to Assets 
ratio. STAND REPORT = release of a stand-alone report: dummy 
variable equal to 1 if company releases a stand-alone CSR report, 0 
otherwise. GENDD _res = the residuals of gender diversity
*, **, and ***significance at p < 0.01; p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respec-
tively
Variables Quality
ENVT PERF 0.00169*** (0.000311)
INDEP − 0.000650*** (0.000248)
GEND DIV 0.000708 (0.000519)
D_POLL 0.00349 (0.00521)
AUDIT 0.0459*** (0.0138)
ENVT COM − 0.0200 (0.0147)
GRENELLE II 0.0349*** (0.0123)
SIZE 0.00676 (0.00827)
PROF 0.000993 (0.00115)
LEV 0.00178*** (0.000359)
STAND REP − 0.0249** (0.0110)
Constant − 0.0590 (0.0585)
Observations 568
R-squared 0.216
Adj R-squared 0.2007
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the same and the coefficient of the dummy variable Grenelle II is positive and sig-
nificant at 10% for quality model. These results indicate the role that plays this new 
law in promoting the credibility of disclosed environmental information given that it 
requires the third party verification of this information. Moreover, after the adoption 
of Grenelle act II, only the independent directors in the board becomes non-signifi-
cant for quality model which implies that the role of those directors become low in 
term of reporting policy.
A possible explanation is that companies start to comply with mandatory require-
ment without any pressure after the promulgation of the Grenelle law II that consti-
tutes an incentive for them to disclose mandatory indicators and pay more attention 
for the quality.
5.4.4  Controlling for potential endogeneity problems
Endogeneity occurs for several reasons including omitted variable biased, measure-
ment error and simultaneity/reverse causation. Prior research has shown that board 
gender diversity is endogenous (Harjoto et al. 2015; Gul et al. 2013). Hence, similar 
to prior research we test for Endogeneity of gender diversity. A Durbin–Wu–Haus-
man test, which uses two-stage-least squares (2SLS) model, is used. Instrumental 
variables need to be included when testing Endogeneity. However, it is very difficult 
to find suitable instrumental variables that satisfy all the characteristics, which is 
why many studies have mistakenly introduced weak instrumental variables (Larcker 
and Rusticus 2010). Following Davidson and Mackinnon (1993), we used the 
residuals of endogenous variables (gender diversity) as a suitable instrumental vari-
able. The residuals are included in the main models as the instrumental variables to 
test for Endogeneity. The results and process to test for Endogeneity are shown in 
Table 9. In the first equation, we examine factors affecting gender diversity using 
the variables used by Harjoto et al. (2015). Following this study independent vari-
ables in our first stage regression are total assets, market performance (Tobin’s Q), 
non-executives’ directors, accounting performance (ROA), women employee, Lag 
gender diversity (percentage of female in the board), sales growth and return.
The error (residual) term GENDD_res is predicted and induced into the second 
regression. The test shows in Table 10 that the residuals of gender diversity is insig-
nificant Prob > F = 0.1909. Thus, the test indicates that there is no Endogeneity issue 
in the model.
6  Concluding remarks, limitations and future research
This paper theoretically examines the logically plausible association between envi-
ronmental disclosure quality and various factors related to the strategy and vision of 
firms, diversity of the board and factors related to the environment. Using content 
analysis of annual and standalone reports of French listed companies in the SBF 120 
from 2009 to 2014, we self-construct our index for quality of environmental disclo-
sure. We draw upon qualitative attributes of financial reporting derived from recom-
mendations of the IASB, FASB and GRI guidelines following Chauvey et al. (2014) 
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to develop a measure of environmental disclosure quality. We find that French com-
panies provide low quality of disclosure however our obtained quality score remains 
better than the quality score of 10.69 obtained by Chauvey et  al. (2014). We also 
document that quality score increased over the period from 2009 to 2014, which 
implies that French companies seek to provide credible information. Drawing upon 
a multi theory framework, the findings of panel data fixed effects regression are gen-
erally consistent with our expectations. We find that third party verification of envi-
ronmental information plays a significant role in improving quality of environmental 
information. Neo institutional theory explains this finding, as firms tend to comply 
with normative pressures exercised by regulators in order to ensure transparency and 
credibility of disclosed information and reinforce the confidence of powerful stake-
holders. In addition, our analyses show that diversity of the board manifested by 
its independence and the presence of female members provides contrasting influ-
ence on the quality of environmental information. Consistent with the view that 
boards that are more diverse are more effective, we find that the presence of female 
members on the board has positive and significant influence. However, independent 
directors have no association with quality which implies that those directors may not 
know the firm’s environmental issues in depth and aim to protect their own inter-
ests. Further, firm’s environmental performance has a positive and significant effect, 
which implies that environmental disclosure helps stakeholders get a better sense 
of how companies can effectively act as good performers. Additional tests have 
Table 9  Using Durbin–Wu–
Hausman (DWH) test for 
endogeneity: regression of 
gender diversity
ASSET = natural log of total assets. TOBINQ = Tobin’s Q ratio 
calculated as the book value of assets minus the book value of 
equities plus the market value of equities, divided by the book 
value of assets. %NON EXCUC = percentage of non-executives’ 
directors. ROA = return on assets: net income/total assets in %. 
Women employee = percentage of women employee in the com-
pany. LAG GEND DIV = lagged value of percentage of female 
in the board. SALES GRWTH = net sales growth within 1  year. 
RETRUN = Annual stock return during the year
*, **, and ***significance at p < 0.01; p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respec-
tively
Variables GEND DIV
ASSET 0.977** (0.434)
TOBINQ − 1.337** (0.592)
%NON EXCUC 0.0206 (0.0230)
ROA 0.000477 (0.0649)
Women employee − 0.00115 (0.0167)
LAG GEND DIV 0.748*** (0.0391)
SALES GRWTH − 0.0204 (0.0375)
RETURN − 1.50e−05 (1.73e−05)
Constant 1.360 (3.339)
Observations 467
R-squared 0.655
Adj R-squared 0.623
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been applied to check the robustness of our results. Sensitivity tests using alterna-
tive measures of quality (GRI adoption) provide generally consistent results with our 
main findings. Moreover, we check the Endogeneity issue following prior research 
and find no problem.
We recognize that our study has some limitations. The findings are restricted 
to large companies and do not take into consideration other significant companies 
which are concerned with the application of the existing regulations. In addition, 
we acknowledge that our measure of environmental disclosure quality may be crit-
icized for subjectivity. It may not capture all dimensions of quality. Nevertheless, 
we believe that our constructed index is a good attempt to refute the assumption 
that quantity is a good proxy of quality and to go beyond the traditional measures. 
Finally, our study has important implications for theory, standards setters and pol-
icy makers. First, this research focuses on the unexplored area of literature related 
to the quality of non-financial reporting drawing upon the regulatory framework of 
financial reporting. Second, it sheds light on whether various factors related to the 
Table 10  Regression 
environmental disclosure 
quality and residuals of Gender 
diversity
ENVT COM = take a value of 1 if an environmental committee 
exists within the board and 0 otherwise. AUDIT = 1 if an environ-
mental audit is provided and 0 otherwise. GEND DIV = percent-
age of women in the board members at the end of the fiscal year. 
INDEP = percentage of independent board members as reported 
by the company. ENVT PERF = ASSET4’s Environmental Score. 
D-POLL = natural log of total  CO2 and  CO2 equivalents emissions. 
SIZE =the natural log of total assets. PROF = net income/total assets 
in %. LEV = debt to assets ratio. STAND REPORT = release of a 
stand-alone report: dummy variable equal to 1 if company releases 
a stand-alone CSR report, 0 otherwise. GENDD _res = the residuals 
of gender diversity
*, **, and ***significance at p < 0.01; p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respec-
tively
Variables Quality
ENVT COM − 0.0152 (0.0308)
ENVT AUDIT 0.0973*** (0.0280)
GEND DIV 0.00220* (0.00130)
INDEP − 0.00101** (0.000508)
ENVT PERF 0.00313*** (0.000640)
D-POLL − 0.000227 (0.0105)
SIZE 0.00680 (0.0165)
PROF 0.00345 (0.00235)
LEV 0.00386*** (0.000724)
STAND REP − 0.0614*** (0.0214)
GENDD_res − 0.00269 (0.00205)
Constant − 0.0738 (0.116)
Observations 468
R-squared 0.201
Adj R-squared 0.181
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diversity of the board, environmental performance and factors related to the envi-
ronment could affect the credibility of disclosed information using a multi theory 
framework. The findings of this research could be seen as another important impli-
cation for standards setters and policy makers as it recommends thinking about 
implementing a generally accepted framework of non-financial reporting to answer 
the demand for more transparency and accountability.
Future research should pursue closer consideration of the effect of other govern-
ance variables using other theoretical frameworks. In addition, future studies could 
study the effect of the structure of environmental committee within the boards. We 
also suggest studying other diversity issues in the boards such as ethnicity, age, 
experience, and tenure. We also suggest studying whether there is an effect of IFRS 
adoption on environmental disclosure.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix 1: Environmental disclosure index
General environmental policy.
• Company efforts to take into account environmental issues and,
• Where appropriate, assessments or environmental certifications.
• Employee training programs on environmental protection.
• Budget dedicated to environmental protection and environmental risk mitigation.
• Financial provisions for environmental risk and pollution.
• Rand D expenditures for pollution abatement.
• Financing for pollution control equipment or facilities.
• The implementation of HSE (Health Safety Environment) approach.
Pollution and waste management.
• Measures to prevent, reduce, or compensate for air,
• Measures to prevent, reduce, or compensate for water,
• Measures to prevent, reduce, or compensate for soil emissions severely affecting 
the environment.
• Measures to prevent, recycle, and dispose of waste.
• Taking into account noise and other forms of pollution specific to activity.
• Significant environmental impacts of transporting products and other goods and 
materials used for the organization’s operations, and transporting members of the 
workforce.
Sustainable use of resources.
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• Water use and water supply based on local constraints.
• Percentage and total volume of water recycled and reused.
• The consumption of raw materials and steps taken to improve their efficient use.
• Energy consumption,
• Measures to improve energy efficiency.
• Percentage of renewable energy used.
• Land use.
Climate change.
• Greenhouse gas emissions.
• Adaptation to climate change impacts.
• Initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and reductions achieved.
• NOx,  SOx, and other significant air emissions by type and weight.
• Total number and volume of significant spills.
Protection of biodiversity.
• Measures taken to preserve or enhance biodiversity.
Environmental management.
• Presence of Independent verification/assurance about environmental information 
disclosed.
• Joint projects with other firms on environmental management.
• Goals and targets.
• Certification ISO 14000.
• Participation in elaborating of environmental standards.
• The existence of environmental department or office for pollution control.
• Existence of terms and conditions applicable to suppliers and/or customers 
regarding environmental practices.
• A statement about the firm’s compliance with existed environmental regulation 
or other schemes (GRI, UNGC, ISO26000).
• Environmental litigation/lawsuits against the company.
• External environmental awards, prizes/or inclusion in sustainability index.
• Commitments to an environmental or sustainable development charter.
• Extra financial environmental rating by Sustainability Rating Agency.
• Participation in environmental association/initiatives to improve environmental 
practices.
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Appendix 2: Environmental disclosure quality measurement
Qualitative character-
istics
Measurement Authors Indexes
Relevance Time specification Michelon et al. (2015)
Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2008)
RELVi =
∑n
i=1
Relevancei
MAX Relevance
1: Forward looking 
information
1: Backward informa-
tion (present or past)
0: No time specifica-
tion
Neutrality 1: Positive information GRI (2006)
Chauvey et al. (2014)
Guthrie and Parker (1990)
NEUTRi =
∑n
i=1
Neutralityi
MAX Neutrality
1: Negative informa-
tion
0: Neutral information
Clarity 1: Monetary Cormier et al. (2005)
Michelon et al. (2015)
Botosan (1997)
CLARi =
∑n
i=1
Clarityi
MAX Clarity
1: Quantitative
0: Declarative (general)
Comparability 1: Comparison with 
previous period
Jonas and Blanchet (2000) COMPi =
∑n
i=1
Comparabilityi
MAX Comparability
1: Comparison with 
other organizations
0: No comparison
Verifiability 1: Presence of audit 
of environment 
disclosure
Grenelle Act II of 2012
Simnett et al. (2009)
VERFi =
∑n
i=1
Verifiabilityi
MAX Verifiability
0: No audit
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